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Abstract: 
This article argues that resource expansion can fail to improve actual student performance 
because it might cause educators to soften grading standards (i.e., induce grade inflation). Our 
theoretical model shows that, depending on schools’ and students’ reactions to resource 
changes, the overall effect of resources on education outcomes is ambiguous. Schools, 
however, have an incentive to adjust their grading structure following resource shifts, such 
that grade inflation is likely to accompany resource-driven policies. Exploiting a quasi-
experimental policy intervention in the Netherlands, we find that additional resources may 
indeed induce grade inflation, particularly when the resource increase is limited.  
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1. Introduction 
The question whether or not resource-driven policies are effective in increasing educational 
quality and student performance remains vigorously debated (for reviews, see Hanushek, 
2003; Hægeland et al., 2012). Most studies in this vast literature analyze school-level exam 
results, rather than standardized central exit exams or SAT scores. In this article, we argue that 
this choice of evaluation standard is not innocuous. The reason is that schools can affect 
observed student performance through their choice of grading standard, which not only 
translate students’ performance into a given grade, but also affect learning effort (Correa and 
Gruver, 1987; Costrell, 1994; Bonesrønning, 2004; Figlio and Lucas, 2004). This suggests that 
resource-driven policies may have both a direct effect on student performance (extensively 
discussed in the foregoing literature), and an indirect one via schools’ endogenous grading 
structure decisions (disregarded in earlier work). The pressure on schools receiving more 
resources to show improved outcomes might indeed induce them to ‘game’ the system and 
‘generate’ better achievements by inflating their grades. 
 
We first set up a simple theoretical framework in which students choose their learning effort 
depending on grading standards, and schools use their grading policy to influence students’ 
behavior (Costrell, 1994; Betts, 1998; Correa and Gruver, 1987; Bonesrønning, 1999). Two 
innovations are brought to this model. First, by explicitly incorporating both a national 
assessment conducted with a uniform correction model (referred to as the ‘central exam’) and 
an assessment developed and graded by each school’s teachers (referred to as the ‘school 
exam’), we assess how educational spending affects both types of evaluation standards. 
Second, educational spending is introduced into the objective functions of students and 
schools, which allows investigating how students’ effort choice as well as the school’s grading 
standard depend on education expenditures. Although existing work has studied the direct 
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effect of education expenditures, as well as the reaction of student effort to grading standards, 
our contribution here lies in connecting these two elements via the school’s reaction to 
expenditure changes. This illustrates that indirect behavioral feedback effects of increased 
education expenditures on schools and students are probable, and that these may counteract 
the intended outcome of higher spending. Specifically, schools are shown to have an incentive 
to adjust their grading standard when resources change, suggesting that grade inflation (i.e., 
assigning higher grades than before for similar performance or similar grades for deteriorating 
performance) following an increase in resources is a realistic possibility.  
 
Then, we evaluate the key implications of the model by exploiting a recent policy intervention 
in the Netherlands, which features two crucial characteristics. First, it created a quasi-
experimental setting where 40 districts in 18 cities received substantial additional block grants 
from the Dutch central government totaling 250 million euro per year (while other, often quite 
similar, districts received no such funding). These additional funds were earmarked for 
investments in social policies such as education as of summer 2007, and the responsible 
minister explicitly made the improvement of educational outcomes one of the core aims of the 
program (Tweede Kamer, 2008-2009). Second, pupils’ school-leaving test results in the Dutch 
education system are determined by both standardized national exit exams and school exams.1 
Since schools only have discretion over the grading standard in the school exam,2 we can, like 
Wikström and Wikström (2005), employ the results of the central exam as a benchmark 
(uniformly applied to all pupils in all schools) against which to set the school exam results. 
 
1  The Dutch education system is not unique in its reliance on multiple performance measures. In the US as well 
as Sweden, both SAT scores and the student’s Grade Point Average matter for college admission applications. 
In Italy and France, universities often organise their own entry test, but nonetheless take the school grade into 
account. The final grade of the German ‘Abitur’ (higher secondary degree) incorporates results from both state-
level central exams and school-level exams collected during the last two years of schooling. 
2  Substantial checks and balances in the Dutch system are explicitly geared towards guaranteeing a constant 
central exam grading policy over time (see below). 
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This setting allows for a difference-in-differences (DiD) identification strategy whereby Dutch 
schools inside/outside the selected districts are compared over the 2004-2006 period before 
the intervention and the 2008-2009 period after the intervention (see also Gerritsen and 
Webbink, 2010; Wittebrood and Permentier, 2011). Our findings show that, on average, there 
is a decline in central exam results, but an (insignificant) relative improvement in school 
exams, in schools located in districts with additional funding. Accounting for the varying size 
of the investment program across districts (ranging from €1.2 million to €29.3 million, or 
€333 to €3995 per resident annually), higher investment is found to significantly dampen the 
relative decline in central-level exam results, while leaving school exams unaffected. Hence, 
increased resources seem to have positively affected central exam results when additional 
funds were sufficiently elevated, but induced grade inflation when funds were limited (i.e., 
under approximately €1250 per resident). These findings are robust to the level of analysis 
(i.e. schools or districts), different specifications of the control group and the implementation 
of a matching estimator exploiting the purposeful assignment to the treatment.  
 
In the next two sections, we briefly review the existing literature and provide a simple 
theoretical model linking public expenditures to education outcomes and incentives for grade 
inflation. Then, in section 4, we discuss the institutional setting and the dataset. Section 5 
contains our methodological approach and empirical results. Finally, section 6 provides a 
concluding discussion. 
 
2. Literature review 
The results of studies analyzing whether resource-driven policies increase schooling quality 
and student performance are, at best, ambiguous (for a review, see Hanushek, 2003; more 
recent contributions include Holmlund et al., 2010; Hægeland et al., 2012). Hoxby (2000) 
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argues that this ambiguity may well derive from differing objective functions of teachers, 
schools or public authorities. Another reason, however, may be that exam systems differ 
widely. In some systems, exams and grading standards are set by schools, while in others 
central standards or exams are set. The latter clearly limits the opportunity for teachers and/or 
schools to affect the grading structure when resources are increased and policy-makers expect 
students’ achievements to improve accordingly.3 A change in education spending may 
therefore have a different observed impact (in terms of exam results) depending on the exam 
system at hand.  
 
While the role of grading standards in the resources-achievement relation has, to the best of 
our knowledge, not been addressed, three related literatures suggest that this may be an 
important oversight. The first investigates how grading standards affect students’ incentives, 
and indicates that students adjust their learning effort to the standard imposed (Correa and 
Gruver, 1987; Costrell, 1994; Betts, 1998; Bonesrønning, 2004; Figlio and Lucas, 2004; 
DePaola and Scoppa, 2007; Babcock, 2010). A second literature considers endogenous 
household responses to school resources. This shows that “parents appear to reduce their effort 
in response to increased school resources” (Houtenville and Conway, 2008, p. 437), and that 
only changes in public education spending unanticipated by households affect test scores (Das 
et al., 2013). Both findings suggest a “‘crowding out’ of school resources” (Houtenville and 
Conway, 2008, p. 437) due to households’ re-optimization efforts. A third relevant literature 
investigates the presence of grade inflation in schools. It shows that, when possible, schools 
indeed engage in grade inflationary practices (Walsh, 1979; Wößmann, 2003). Taking these 
three literatures together suggests that increased resources can trigger endogenous re-
optimizing responses, which may, whenever possible, take the form of schools inflating their 
3 Bishop and Wößmann (2004) argue that centralized assessment standards improve grades’ signaling value on 
the labor market because there is no option to ‘inflate’ grades in such a setting. 
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grades. Since students, in turn, might react to changing grading standards through their effort 
choice, grading standards may play a key role in the resources-achievement relation. 
 
This naturally raises the question what determines grading practices (and whether resource 
shifts are one of these determinants). In this respect, two key factors are discussed in the 
existing literature. The first are accountability systems that evaluate teachers’ and schools’ 
performance via students’ test scores. Apart from exerting a positive effect on students’ 
achievements (Carnoy and Loeb 2002; Koning and van der Wiel 2012), undesired side-effects 
of such systems range from focusing teaching effort on pupils with achievements close to 
tests’ thresholds (Reback, 2008; Neal and Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010; Rockoff and 
Turner, 2010) to the distortion of results and cheating by teachers (i.e. grade inflation; Jacob 
and Levitt, 2003). The second determinant of grading practices is student ‘demand’. 
Bonesrønning (1999), for instance, argues that rent-seeking students may press for easy 
grading while DePaola and Scoppa (2010) highlight diverging preferences of high- and low-
ability students for precise versus noisy grading (see also Himmler and Schwager, 2013). 
However, the only study explicitly linking school resources to grading practices is Backes-
Gellner and Veen (2008). They argue that schools have incentives to lower their grading 
standard if their budget depends on the number of students. Although they do not provide a 
formal verification, their argument suggests that grading standards might depend on financial 
constraints. Yet, it does not necessarily imply that this likewise holds for public education 
expenditures. This is the question addressed in the remainder of this article. 
 
3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 Assumptions 
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We consider two key actors in the educational process: students and schools (an extension 
including teachers is straightforward). Students’ utility is assumed to depend on leisure l and 
exam results y: i.e., uSTU=uSTU(y,l) with ul >0, uy > 0, ull < 0, uyy <0 (subscripts denote partial 
derivatives). To obtain explicit results, we assume that the utility function is similar among 
students and has a Cobb-Douglas specification: uSTU=yαl(1-α).4 Furthermore, students are 
endowed with one unit of time, which they can devote either to leisure l or to studying e: i.e., 
l+e = 1. 
 
The overall exam result (y) is a function of the results in both a central (denoted by c) and a 
school exam (denoted by s), y=y(c(nc,e,x),s(ns,e,x)), thereby reflecting the idea that student 
performance is often measured via both types of exams (see note 1 for international 
evidence).5 The grading standard nc is decided upon by a central institution and is constant 
across all schools, whereas the school’s grading policy, ns, is chosen locally and can differ 
between schools. A higher grading standard, i.e. an increase in either nc or ns, causes a 
decrease of the overall exam result y.6 In contrast to other models investigating the 
relationship between educational standards and student effort, we do not model the standard as 
a threshold value of points or a grade which students must obtain to successfully graduate. 
4  While more general forms of the utility function could be imagined, the Cobb-Douglas representation captures 
several useful and intuitive properties also imposed in the foregoing literature. For instance, it implies positive 
marginal utility in both achievement and leisure (Correa and Gruver, 1987; Costrell, 1994; Bonesrønning, 
1999), partial but not perfect substitutability between both goods (which appears a realistic description of 
human behavior), and incorporates education costs in a simple fashion (which makes further restrictive 
assumptions on this unnecessary). 
5  The measuring unit of exam results is points. As the total number of points achievable in tests (and especially 
in final exams) is sufficiently large in most cases, c, s and y are assumed to be continuous variables. 
6 Note that this assumption implies that the student’s utility function is strictly decreasing in nc. The national 
examiner could thus, in principle, make all students happier by increasing everyone’s grade. In practice, 
however, grades awarded at the level of secondary education commonly cover the entire available spectrum 
(e.g., in Belgium, Italy, Norway, United Kingdom, United States or the Netherlands; exceptions occur in, for 
instance, France or Spain), which prevents exploitation of students’ ‘grade illusion’. Moreover, the model’s key 
empirical implications remain unaffected when students do not maximize absolute achievement y, but relative 
achievement y y  (where y  is the average achievement across all schools in the country; full details upon 
request). 
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Instead, we assume that graduation certificates differentiate between numerous possible 
grades and not only between the passing or failing of the exam. The underlying assumption is 
that the final grade y not only serves as a signal to employers but also contains information on 
a student’s productivity. With the existence of central exams, the results of students from 
different schools are at least partly comparable, which justifies this assumption. Both exam 
results furthermore depend on learning effort, e, and per-pupil education expenditures 
available to the school, x and increase in both of these variables.  
 
In the analysis below, we specify the exam result function as follows (though similar results 
are obtained with alternative specifications; see, for instance, Appendix A): 
 
0 0
( , , ) ( , , )
1 1
c s
c s
c sc s
c e x n s e x n
y p n xe p n xe
n n
= =
= − + + − +
 
                                              (1) 
In this specification, the grades on both exams act as perfect substitutes. Nevertheless, 
introducing weights reflecting the relative importance of the central and school exam would 
not alter the results qualitatively.7 Both the central and school results consist of one part that is 
constant in student effort (pc0-nc and ps0-ns) and another part that can be influenced by learning 
1 ,  with ,i xe i s cn
 = 
 
. The former can be interpreted as the number of points a student achieves 
without any learning (i.e., the so-called specificity of a test), and measures the general 
difficulty of the exam (with pi0 reflecting the grade under the easiest exam possible).8 The 
latter part models the relation between educational expenditures and exam results as a linear 
function (though more general specifications do not qualitatively change the results; available 
7 Note also that one could allow each grade to enter the determination of y non-linearly or let y reflect that a very 
bad grade on either exam is very damaging to students’ achievement. We leave those issues aside here, and, for 
clarity of presentation, focus on the simplest possible formulation. 
8 Since any pi0 > 0 merely increases the results for all students and thus provides no information on knowledge 
differences, we will assume pi0=0 to save on notation. 
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upon request) and assumes that tougher grading lowers the positive effect of an additional unit 
of effort on exam results.9 Note that although the basic model abstracts from students having 
different learning abilities (which influence the individual productivity of effort and thus the 
exam result), Appendix B shows that the model’s main results are not altered if an ability 
distribution is introduced. 
 
As mentioned, schools decide on their grading policy ns, and we assume that they can enforce 
its implementation in all classes. Schools’ utility is assumed to depend on student performance 
y and the difference in results on the central and the school exam: i.e. uSCH=uSCH(y,(c-s)2). We 
assume that uy > 0. While there are many possible arguments to substantiate this assumption, 
one reason is that schools compete over exam results to attract students and parents – and 
often also the government – use them to evaluate schools (e.g. Wikström and Wikström, 2005; 
Reback, 2008; Neal and Whitmore Schanzenbach, 2010; Rockoff and Turner, 2010). 
Moreover, we assume that 2( ) 0c su − < , which captures the idea that deviations between the two 
exam results are harmful to the school in either direction. That is, if s<c parents may decide to 
send their kids to another school to get better overall grades, while if s>c a school may lose 
students because teachers’ requirements – and thereby students’ knowledge gain – are deemed 
too low.10 Below, we employ a simple additive structure for the schools’ utility function: 
2( )SCHu y c s= − − . 
9  While the direction of the grading policy effect on the effort-result relation would in a more general framework 
obviously depend on how the mapping from underlying learning to measured achievement varies across both 
exam types, we here implicitly assume that students can always improve their results on both exam types by 
increasing effort. Although this is somewhat restrictive when considering a single test (as students could in 
principle obtain the maximum feasible grade), it is a reasonable approximation for a set of final exams 
accumulated across several subjects. Still, taking a more agnostic approach and assuming that returns to effort 
may differ in some unknown way across exam types does not qualitatively affect our findings. We are grateful 
to Julie Cullen for this insight. 
10 In a country without catchment areas, competition for students between schools may lead schools to also care 
about neighbouring schools’ performance. In this case, households choose which school to attend by comparing 
the achievable utility, given the educational standards and expenditures of all schools (cf. Koning and van der 
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 The timing of events is as follows: In a first step, schools choose their grading standard, 
knowing the per-pupil expenditures x they are (exogenously) assigned by the government. 
Afterwards, students observe the grading policy and choose their learning effort.11 
 
3.2 Students’ decision 
Solving the model backwards, the students’ maximization problem is:  
     (1 )max           s.t.     1  STU
e
u y l l eα α−= = +                                      (2) 
The first-order-condition yields: 
 
(1 )
1 1 1 1          (1 ) (1 ) 0.
STU
c s
c s c s
du y ll y
de e e
e x n xe n xe
n n n n
α α
α α
∂ ∂
= + −
∂ ∂
   = − + − − − + − + =   
   
                  (3) 
 
The first summand of equation (3) shows the marginal revenue of an increase in student effort: 
exam performance (and thus utility) rises.  The second summand shows that effort decreases 
the amount of time devoted to leisure, which lowers utility and thus represents the marginal 
cost of higher effort. In equilibrium, students choose their learning effort such that marginal 
revenue equals marginal cost. Hence, optimal student effort as a function of expenditures and 
central and school grading standards equals: 
 * (1 )
c sn ne
x
α α= + − . (4) 
Wiel, 2013) - and the number of students thus may enter the school's utility function. To most clearly isolate the 
expenditure effects we are interested in, we abstract from such competition effects here.  
11 Although the government can be seen as a third actor setting both expenditures x and the central grading 
standard nc, we refrain from explicitly modelling the government’s optimization problem. The reason is that we 
are interested in schools’ reaction to an (exogenous) change in expenditures, rather than the optimal choice of x 
and nc. Moreover, any adjustment of nc concomitant to a change in x would influence students’ and schools’ 
behaviour, thus distorting the effect of the expenditure change we are interested in. 
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From equation (4), it is easy to see that effort increases in both the central and the school’s 
grading scheme and declines in per-student expenditures. The latter effect materializes 
because x directly increases exam results and thereby substitutes student effort. The intuition 
for the former effect is that harsher grading has a negative effect on exam results, which 
stimulates students to work harder in order to make up the loss (even though tougher grading 
diminishes the return of effort in terms of improved exam results).12 Various empirical studies 
present evidence for such positive relationship between grading standards and (average) 
student achievement, also arguing that this effect arises from an increase in effort (Betts and 
Grogger, 2003; Figlio and Lucas, 2004).  
 
3.3 Schools’ decision 
Anticipating students’ reaction to the grading policy, the school’s maximization problem and 
first-order condition read: 
 ( )2max ( *) ( *) ( *)
s
SCH
n
u y e c e s e= − −  
and 
( )
2 2
( *) ( *) ( *)2 ( *) ( *)
1 1          1 2 (2 )( ) 2 .αα α α α
∂ ∂ ∂ = − − − ∂ ∂ ∂ 
      = − + − − − + − − +      
      
SCH
s s s s
s c
s c s s
du y e c e s ec e s e
dn n n n
x xn n x
n n n n
           (5) 
 
Equation (5) illustrates the marginal effects of a change in the school’s grading scheme. First, 
the grading standard chosen will affect the overall exam result y: 
 
12 As grading standards are not modelled as threshold values that must be met, there exists no situation in which 
students will, in response to a standard increase, lower their effort because standards have become too 
demanding (Costrell, 1994; Betts, 1998). 
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  2
1 11 .s s s c s
y xe e x
n n n n n
∂ ∂  = − − + + ∂ ∂  
                                         (6) 
 
Equation (6) shows that an increase of ns has a direct negative effect on the school exam 
results, represented by the first two summands: Harsher grading lowers each student’s results. 
Moreover, an indirect effect arises because students adjust their learning effort e. Given the 
positive relationship between grading standards and effort 0s
e
n
∂ > ∂ 
, they will study harder 
to compensate for the loss of points caused by the direct effect. This reaction will positively 
influence the grades on both the school and the central exam. Consequently, student 
performance on the central exam improves following an increase in the school’s grading 
standard ( *) 0s
dc e
dn
 > 
 
 (as no negative direct effect exists), whereas results on the school 
exam may both improve or decline. At the equilibrium effort level e*, the negative direct 
effect dominates both at the school level ( *) 0s
ds e
dn
 < 
   
and in the aggregate ( *) 0s
dy e
dn
 < 
 
. 
Hence, schools can improve students’ overall exam results by lowering their grading 
standards. 
 
The second summand in equation (5) shows that the grading standard chosen will affect the 
difference between school and central exam results. As shown above, an increase in ns raises c 
but lowers s at the optimal effort choice e*. The sign of the overall effect thereby depends on 
the sign of the original difference c-s. If c-s > 0, an increase of the school’s grading standard 
causes two negative effects by both lowering the overall exam result y and increasing the 
difference c-s. Thus, a corner solution arises in which the school has an incentive to decrease 
ns. For an inner solution to exist, c-s < 0 must hold. In this case, tougher grading reduces the 
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difference between the two exam results. This effect provides schools with an incentive to 
increase its grading standard ns, which counteracts the incentive to inflate grades discussed 
above. 
 
As it is not possible to solve equation (5) for ns*(x,nc) explicitly, we investigate the effect of 
higher education expenditures on the grading standard with the implicit function theorem 
 
2
2
2
.
SCH
s s
SCH
s
u
dn n x
udx
n
∂
∂ ∂= −
∂
∂
                                                              (7) 
As the denominator of equation (7) is the second-order condition of the school’s optimization 
problem in equation (5), it must be negative at the utility-maximizing standard. The sign of the 
overall effect in equation (7) is thereby defined by the numerator, which reads: 
 
2 2 2 2
2
2
2
2 ( )
1 1 12
            2 .
1 1(2 )( )
SCH
s s s s s s
c s s
s
s c
c s s
u y c s c s c sc s
x xn x n x n n n x n x
x
n n n
n
n n x
n n n
α α α
α
αα α
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂  = − − − + − −    ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂     
   − − + +   
   = − −
   − − + −   
   
(8)                           
 
Two opposing effects can be distinguished. The first summand shows that the effect of a 
higher grading standard on y varies in x. At the equilibrium effort level e* it can be shown that 
2
0s
y
n x
∂
<
∂ ∂
holds. Thus, an increase in expenditures reinforces the incentive for schools to 
choose an easier grading policy.13 The second term illustrates that both the difference c-s as 
13 Remember that schools’ utility depends on y because students’ exam results are often publicly available (e.g., 
in the Netherlands, the average final grade within each school becomes public information). Parents as well as 
governmental institutions thus are able to employ exam results to evaluate a school’s performance and its use of 
monetary resources, which underlies schools’ incentive to reduce grading standards and improve observed 
outcomes (see equation (5)). Moreover, as governments expect a positive (direct) effect of higher expenditures 
13 
 
                                                          
well as the change of this difference in ns vary in x. Inserting e* reveals that the second 
summand is positive in equilibrium. Thus, higher education expenditures strengthen the 
decrease in the difference between school and central exam results generated by a higher ns 
(see above). Hence, schools face a stronger incentive to increase their grading standard 
following an increase in expenditures. 
 
Overall, grade inflation following an increase in educational expenditures is observed if 
equation (7) is negative, which requires that the cross-derivative in equation (8) is negative as 
well. The occurrence of this constellation depends on the original level of x as well as on the 
central exam grading standard nc. The school’s aim to provide its students with a high level of 
y causes an incentive for grade inflation, whereas the objective to minimize the difference c-s 
counteracts this effect. Intuitively, the incentive to lower ns grows stronger the more important 
exam results y become in the school’s objective function compared to other goals. As such, 
while grade inflation following increased public education expenditures is certainly a 
theoretical possibility, it remains an empirical question whether or not it occurs in reality. The 
theoretical model thus allows us to derive the following predictions, which will be tested 
empirically in section 4.  
 
Prediction 1: An increase in educational spending changes the schools’ grading behaviour.  
Prediction 2: If nS increases (decreases), results on the central exam improve (deteriorate), 
whereas results on the school-level exam deteriorate (improve). 
 
3.4 Effect on student attainment 
on achievement, an increased incentive to engage in grade inflation arises because schools will attempt to cater 
to this expectation. 
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We can now assess the overall effect an expenditure change exerts on educational attainment 
(as extensively discussed in the foregoing literature). Presuming the relationships between 
expenditures, school grading standards and effort analyzed above, we have: 
 
 2
1 1 1 .
s s s
c s s s
dy e e n n ne x xe
dx x x x xn n n n
  ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ = + + + − −    ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂∂    
                      (9) 
 
Equation (9) shows that the following effects can be distinguished: First, the direct effect of an 
expenditure increase is unambiguously positive for both exam types. Second, students 
decrease their effort as a direct reaction to higher expenditures, which has a negative impact 
on y. Third, the school’s grading standard will be altered, which directly affects the school-
level exam results. Finally, student effort changes in response to the change in ns. If an 
expenditure increase induces grade inflation 0
sn
x
 ∂
< ∂ 
, the third effect will be positive 
(improving school exam results), but the fourth effect becomes negative, causing school exam 
results and effort – as well as overall results – to deteriorate. It is worth highlighting that by 
these various effects, our theoretical framework provides a possible explanation for the 
ambiguity in the empirical literature about the effects of increased educational spending. 
Indeed, even when assuming that an increase in educational spending has a positive direct 
influence on student achievement, adjustments in students’ and schools’ behavior in response 
to changes in available resources may create important counteracting effects (which can under 
certain conditions dominate the direct effect).  
 
4. Institutional setting and data 
4.1 Financing Dutch schools 
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Since 1917, all Dutch schools receive a fixed allowance per enrolled student from the central 
government budget. The size of each school’s budget thus depends on the number of students, 
their age and the type of education (i.e. general or vocational). Higher allowances are thereby 
provided for children whose parents have lower education levels (as such children are 
assumed to have higher educational needs). Specifically, the Ministry of Education 
distinguishes between the situation where both parents failed to complete higher secondary 
education and the situation where one parent completed higher secondary education while the 
other one did not. Children in the former situation induce a 30% higher allowance, while 
children in the latter situation induce a 20% higher allowance. The total budget received by 
the schools is a ‘lump sum’ transfer covering both material (about 15% of the budget) and 
personnel expenses (about 85% of the budget). 
 
4.2. The intervention: Earmarked block grants in specific districts 
As in most Western countries, some neighborhoods in the Netherlands are characterized by a 
combination of poverty, unemployment and social instability. Shortly after its appointment on 
22 February 2007, the Balkenende IV administration announced a new policy program 
allocating block grants to 40 such districts (labeled ‘power districts’, or ‘krachtwijken’ in 
Dutch) – consisting of 83 postcode areas situated in 18 large and medium-sized Dutch cities14 
– earmarked to improve their social, physical and economic environment. The total subsidy 
amounted to 250 million euro annually (ranging from €1.2 million to €29.3 million across 
districts, or €333 to €3995 per inhabitant), and the selection of the districts was driven by a set 
of 18 indicators including the income, education and unemployment levels within the local 
population and the incidence of public disorder issues (Tweede Kamer, 2008-2009). The final 
decision to include or exclude districts was taken by the minister (i.e., Ella Vogelaar) roughly 
14  The selection of postcode areas was based on a long-list with 180 additional postcode areas (which did not 
receive additional funding). Information on the excluded postcodes has not been made public, and is 
considered ‘highly confidential’ by the Dutch government. 
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one month after the new government was inaugurated, and the program was announced and 
implemented in July 2007. The program lasts for 10 years, and no restrictions were imposed 
on how the funds could be used (except being subject to agreement between the municipality, 
housing corporations, schools and other local stakeholders).  
 
Although the speed and organization of the selection process precluded lobbying efforts by 
districts desiring to be included (thus mitigating concerns about potential self-selection), the 
selection process obviously was non-random since the government aimed at selecting the 
worst-performing districts. Fortunately, the government selected only 40 districts and thus left 
a substantial number of similarly ‘underperforming’ districts outside the chosen sample, which 
we exploit below. As a result, we are left with a quasi-experimental setting where some 
underperforming districts received additional funding while other underperforming districts 
did not.  
 
We should also note that while the various actors involved in the policy program (i.e., schools, 
local government, housing corporations and the regional government) retained some leeway in 
setting their objectives, schooling and youth received substantial attention across the board. 
For instance, in 16 out of the 18 cities with power districts, investments were explicitly aimed 
at improving the schooling outcomes of local youth. This makes the improvement of 
education the most central and commonly stated ambition in the power district policy (Tweede 
Kamer, 2008-2009, p. 68).15 
 
4.3. The data 
15 Excluding both cities that did not explicitly mention education investments in their power districts policy 
program leaves our results unaffected (details upon request). 
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In the final year of secondary education, all students in the Netherlands have to take two 
exams for each course in which they received lessons (independent of the educational track). 
The first exam – the ‘central exam’ – is a national assessment constructed by the Central 
Institute for Assessments (CITO). It is, by definition, an absolute assessment with criterion- 
referencing. It is externally screened by professors and a prior test on a sample of students is 
taken to measure and monitor its difficulty, which is thereby guaranteed to remain constant 
over time. Correction of this central exam is based on a uniform correction model and there is 
a teacher from a different school acting as a second corrector. Only three small courses do not 
have a central exam: i.e. civics, arts and physical education.  
 
The second exam – the ‘school exam’ – has fewer quality controls in its construction and 
evaluation as it is set up and corrected only by a school’s teachers. Moreover, part of the grade 
on the school exam is earned during the year in the form of intermediate tests and 
assignments. Nevertheless, the school exam is also criterion-referenced as there is a strict legal 
framework setting out the knowledge achievements required of students at the end of each 
year for each course. The student’s final overall grade consists of the arithmetic average of the 
central and the school exam (no additional information is incorporated). 
 
Our central variables of interest are the results on the central and school exams, which are 
collected on an average level across subjects within schools on an annual basis. For ease of 
interpretation, we recalibrate all grades into the 0-10 band (in which 0 is the worst and 10 the 
best grade possible). Unfortunately, data on the individual subjects are unavailable. Yet, the 
average grades per school we employ in the analysis below become publicly available 
information, and is used by parents and Education Inspectorate to compare schools and 
evaluate their quality.  
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 The dataset – originating from the Dutch Ministry of Education – includes information for 738 
schools, which are well spread across the Netherlands, over the period 2004-2009 (previous 
years could not be included due to data inconsistencies). Descriptive statistics are presented in 
Table 1 for the period before (2004-06) and after (2008-09) the policy intervention, and for 
schools in treated/untreated districts.16 Table 1 illustrates that the average grades on the central 
exit exam lie below those on the school exam (a common observation in the Netherlands; see 
also Dronkers, 2012), and that the average difference between both types of exams increases 
over time. This holds for schools in both treated and untreated districts, though it appears 
substantially stronger in the former subsample. This increased divergence of school and 
central exam results is largely driven by worsening central exam results (for a similar 
observation, see Dronkers, 2012). Still, Table 1 hides significant heterogeneity across schools 
in both observations, which we exploit in the analysis below. 
__________________ 
Table 1 about here 
___________________ 
 
Table 1 also contains summary statistics for a number of control variables (likewise separated 
before/after treatment and by schools inside/outside treated districts). While we unfortunately 
lack information about, for instance, the number (or quality) of teachers and school provisions 
(such as the number of computer terminals and the presence/size of a school library), we do 
have information on the size of the student population in a subset (N=523) of schools. We also 
observe postcode information for each school, such that we can match each school to data on 
socio-demographic characteristics in its neighborhood (obtained from Statistics Netherlands). 
16  We exclude the year of the intervention (i.e., 2007) even though exams for that year had already passed by the 
time of the intervention and thus could not possibly be influenced by it. 
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This provides information on the number of inhabitants, urbanization (5-point scale where 1 is 
urban and 5 is rural), percentage of employed residents and welfare recipients (both as share 
of working-age population), average income (measured as after-tax income in 1000€) and the 
percentage of young (under 25), old (over 65) and immigrants (each as a share of total 
population). One important thing to note from these statistics is that treated districts where 
larger, younger, poorer (which observable in terms of income, employment and social welfare 
recipients) and ethnically more diverse than untreated districts. As this may induce selection 
bias, we will employ this information extensively in our robustness checks in section 5.3. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1. Empirical Strategy   
Our analysis exploits the variation in public investment across space and time due to the July 
2007 policy intervention via a difference-in-differences (DiD) approach. The existence of 
comparable districts without additional funding allows us to infer the counterfactual outcome 
and estimate the causal impact of public resources. Particularly, we compare educational 
outcomes in Dutch schools inside the 40 districts covered by the new legislation (the ‘treated’ 
group; 35 schools in 27 districts) with those not covered by the new legislation (the ‘control’ 
group; 703 schools in 493 districts) before/after 2007 using information covering the 2004-
2009 period. Consequently, the control group in our basic specification consists of all 
observed schools not located in a power district. Still, as the similarity of the treated and the 
control group is critical for the validity of our inferences, we extensively test the robustness of 
our results to the specification of the control group in section 5.3. Note also that since DiD 
approaches yield inconsistent standard errors when analyzing serially correlated outcomes, we 
follow the suggestion of Bertrand et al. (2004) to average exam results by school over the 
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period before (i.e., 2004-2006) and following (i.e., 2008-2009) the intervention. This leads to 
the following baseline specification (with subscript i for schools and t for time): 
 
 SE_CEi,t = γi + β1 Timet + β2 PowerDistricti,t * Timet + ⅀k λk Xi,t + εi,t, (10) 
 
SE_CEi,t reflects the difference at time t in the mean result of school i’s pupils on the school 
exams (SE) and the central exams (CE). Positive numbers indicate that school exams 
performance exceeds that on central exams (and vice versa). We also estimate the model 
separately for SE and CE as this yields an indication on the progress in educational attainment. 
The variable PowerDistricti,t is an indicator variable equal to 1 for schools in districts 
receiving additional block grants, and 0 otherwise. The indicator variable Timet separates the 
period before (Timet=0; i.e., the 2004-2006 period) and after the policy intervention (Timet=1; 
i.e., the 2008-2009 period). To control for unobserved heterogeneity across schools – also 
among schools within the power districts – Equation (10) includes school-specific (γi) fixed 
effects that capture all time-invariant differences across schools. The variable of interest is the 
interaction between Timet and PowerDistricti,t, whose coefficient β2  estimates the causal 
effect of the policy intervention on SE_CEi,t. Xi,t stands for a vector of (k=5) control variables 
including the district population size, the school’s student number (both in logarithmic form), 
and the share of immigrant, young and old residents in the district population. Their inclusion 
is critical to adjust for any differences in educational attainment that are a function of the 
population and student composition (Angrist and Pischke, 2008; Fiva, 2009) – especially 
when the government’s selection process may have been influenced by such observable socio-
demographic indicators.17  
17  The information on urbanization, employment, income and the share of welfare recipients mentioned above is 
only available for the year 2003, and thus cannot be included in our fixed effects estimation. We do, however, 
use this information in our robustness checks based on a matching estimator (see section 5.3). 
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 Still, this baseline approach ignores the variation across power districts in the level of 
additional resources created by the new legislation. We can exploit this information for 
identification purposes by expanding the model with this “explanatory variable with differing 
treatment intensity across localities” (Berrebi and Klor, 2008, p. 208; Angrist and Pischke, 
2008). This extends our estimation equation to: 
 
 SE_CEi,t = γi + β1 Timet + β2 PowerDistricti,t * Timet + β3 Investmenti,t + ⅀k λk Xi,t + εi,t  (11) 
 
where Investmenti,t equals the level of annual additional public investment (in 1000€ per 
capita) in the district of school i at time t deriving from the new policy program. Clearly, this 
is 0 before the intervention, but varies across schools after the intervention (though remaining 
0 in ‘untreated’ districts). Its inclusion permits disentangling the effect of receiving the status 
as ‘Power district’ at time t (β2) from the effect of the public expenditures associated with this 
status (β3).18 
  
The key identifying assumption underlying equations (10) and (11) is that the trends in 
educational outcomes in school in treated and untreated districts would be the same except for 
the intervention (the parallel time trend assumption; Bertrand et al., 2004).19 This raises three 
issues in our setting. First, as mentioned, the government selected the worst-performing 
18  Clearly, this is only one way to assess the effect of the level of investment, and we implemented a number of 
alternative approaches to assess the robustness of our findings. First, we estimated a model including school 
fixed effects, a time dummy, and the Investmentit variable (along with its squared version to assess any non-
linearity). Second, we implemented a replication of equation (10) that includes a series of three dummies 
effectively splitting the original DiD coefficient into three parts depending on investment size (i.e. low, 
medium or high). Third, we estimated equation (10) for different subsamples of schools depending on the size 
of the investment (i.e. low, medium or high). In all three cases, the results mirror those presented below 
(details upon request). We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting these alternatives. 
19  Obviously, treated and untreated districts should also be similar in terms of their pre-existing attributes (i.e. 
apart from the treatment). We deal with this assumption extensively in section 5.3. 
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districts non-randomly. Second, selection into the program may have triggered migration 
flows, which could invoke violation of the parallel time trend assumption. In this respect, it is 
important to observe that the list of selected districts was only made publicly available after a 
lengthy legal proceeding in February 2009. Consequently, any in- or outward mobility 
between July 2007 and (at least) February 2009 can reasonably be taken as independent of 
residents’ district being included in the list. This is important as students in the Netherlands 
have free school choice (there is no catchment area). Moreover, data from Statistics 
Netherlands illustrate that the share of western and non-western migrants, natives, citizens 
under 20 or over 65 years, employed, unemployed and one-parent-families is stable over time 
in both treated and untreated districts (i.e., the share of these respective population groups 
does not change significantly over the 2004-2009 period). These statistics strongly suggests 
that there were no obvious changes in the underlying population in the 2004-2009 period. 
Third, selection into the program may have affected students’ drop-out behavior. Such 
changes in the retention of ‘marginal’ students before/after the treatment could invoke 
violation of the parallel time trend assumption. To address this concern, we collected 
additional information on drop-out rates (i.e. the share of students leaving school without a 
diploma), and replicated our analysis using this as an alternative left-hand side variable 
(N=640 schools). We do not find any effect of the treatment, nor of treatment size, on drop out 
rates (details upon request). 
 
To also more directly test the parallel time trend assumption, we compare the evolution of 
central and school exam grades across treated and untreated districts over the 2004-2007 
period (given the timing of exams, this period completely precedes the July 2007 
intervention). This is achieved by running a regression that mirrors equation (10) for the 2004-
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2007 period.20 The results, summarized in Table 2, indicate that central exam grades are 
significantly lower in 2006-2007 compared to 2004-2005 (β = –0.203, p<0.01). Nonetheless, 
and crucially, we find no evidence that this downward pre-treatment trend is different for our 
treatment and control groups (β = –0.009, p>0.10). The same observations likewise hold for 
school-level exam grades (Column 2). Strictly speaking, the results in Table 2 only verify the 
validity of equation (10). We obtain very similar results, however, when we replicate this test 
for different subsamples of districts depending on the size of the investment (i.e. low, medium 
or high). This supports the parallel time trend assumption also for schools in districts with 
varying investment levels, which validates equation (11). 
__________________ 
Table 2 about here 
___________________ 
 
5.2. Empirical Results  
Our baseline findings, which exploit the full set of 738 available schools, are summarized in 
Table 3 (section 5.3 reports on a number of robustness checks with more restrictive control 
groups). Columns (1) through (3) provide results for the estimation of equation (10). Columns 
(4) through (6) also include the annual investment level due to the policy program within 
every district. In each case, the first column (i.e., column (1) and (4)) has as dependent 
variable the difference between school and central exam results (to assess Prediction 1), while 
the next two columns have, respectively, school and central exam results as dependent 
variables (to assess Prediction 2). Throughout the analysis below, all models are estimated at 
the school level because our key dependent variables (i.e., exam results) are recorded at this 
20  Note that the number of schools reduces to 636 in this time period due to missing observations. We show 
below that our main findings hold for both the full sample of 738 schools, and this reduced sample of 636 
schools. 
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level. However, since the policy intervention happens at the district level, an argument could 
also be made for an analysis at the district level. To check whether this affects our findings, 
we averaged the school-level outcomes at district level, and estimated equations (10) and (11) 
at the district level. Our main results are unaffected by this change in the level of analysis (full 
results available upon request). 
 
The results in Table 3 indicate that when looking at the policy intervention using an indicator 
variable (columns (1) through (3)), the evidence regarding Predictions 1 and 2 is relatively 
weak. The interaction effects remain statistically insignificant at conventional levels, 
suggesting that the policy intervention did not affect either school or central exams. Although 
one explanation may lie in the fact that we evaluate the policy intervention immediately after 
the investments started,21 it might also be that a simple dummy for treated/untreated districts 
obscures differences in the effects due to the varying treatment intensity. Columns (4) through 
(6) show that the level of the additional investment indeed plays a critical role. Particularly, 
while there still is no insignificant effect for school-level exam results (column (5)), we now 
observe a statistically significant negative effect on central exam results until the investment 
surpasses approximately €1250 per resident. For higher levels of investment, there is no 
significant impact although the marginal effect becomes positive around €2000 per resident 
(column (6)).  
___________________ 
Table 3  
___________________ 
 
21  If improvements take some time to fully develop and become visible in exam grades, this may exert 
downward pressure on our coefficient estimates. This possible delay should not, however, undermine our 
ability to detect (potential) adjustments in school-level grading practices.  
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To properly interpret these results, it is important to note that teachers often grade students 
based on (i) valued characteristics that do not readily translate into better performance on 
standardized exams (e.g., students’ behaviour/civic attitude, or performance relative to initial 
ability level) or (ii) a grading curve that remains fairly stable over time. Although our DiD 
strategy eliminates the static component of locally-assigned grades along these dimensions, 
the evidence in Table 3 seems consistent with the idea that teachers continue to grade students 
on a similar curve regardless of their absolute levels of performance. However, keeping to the 
same curve despite deteriorating national exam results (i.e., the negative effect on CE) de 
facto amounts to a reduction of the grading standard. From the theoretical model, we know 
that such weaker school-level grading negatively affects student effort, which induces 
deterioration in students’ performance in the central exam while (weakly) improving 
performance in the school exam (see section 3.3). This is exactly what we observe in Table 3. 
Overall, our main findings therefore suggest that the policy intervention worked to halt falling 
central exam results in the selected districts when additional funds were sufficiently elevated, 
but induced grade inflation – by schools (or teachers) failing to downgrade mean locally-
assigned grades in spite of declining scores on national exams – when such funds were 
limited.  
 
Reconsidering the underlying mechanism(s), one particularly interesting possibility may be 
that schools in districts receiving less funding might have used these resources for more basic 
investments (e.g., sport facilities, library expansion, computer or media rooms) that 
predominantly have an impact i) in the long run (but are unobservable within the short period 
analysed), ii) on students’ behaviour/civic attitude (which is reflected rather in school than 
national exams), and iii) on topics not covered by the central test (i.e., civics, sport, art). While 
the first two of these effects can be categorized as specific forms of grade inflation – since 
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locally-assigned test results would not reflect students’ real, current academic performance – 
the latter cannot. Unfortunately, the lack of detailed spending data prevents us from 
investigating this issue in further detail. 
 
5.3. Robustness Checks 
Since the power districts were purposefully chosen by the government, one evident worry is 
that the above results are driven by the dissimilarity of ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ districts in 
pre-existing attributes (see Table 1). To attenuate such concerns, we implemented a number of 
robustness checks. The first of these replicates all estimations in Table 3 restricting the sample 
to schools in districts with at least as many inhabitants, young citizens or migrants, and at 
most the number of older citizens than the 40 treated districts. Table 4 shows that none of 
these restrictions – which increase the similarity between comparison districts – changes the 
inferences from those reported in Table 3. The same holds also when we impose all four 
restrictions at the same time to obtain the most restrictive – and therefore most comparable – 
control group feasible.  
___________________ 
Table 4 about here 
___________________ 
 
Secondly, we implemented a matching estimator (using psmatch2 in Stata12; Leuven and 
Sianesi, 2010) because this approach exploits the purposeful assignment to the treatment and 
allows us to incorporate additional time-invariant background characteristics of the districts 
(see above). To match treated districts to similar untreated districts in this analysis, we ran a 
probit regression using population size, percentage immigrants, the level of urbanization, the 
percentage of employed residents and welfare recipients (both as share of working-age 
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population) and average income in the district (measured as after-tax income in 1000€) as 
explanatory variables. We also include squared terms of the share of immigrants and income. 
The resulting model satisfies the balancing properties of the matching procedure as there 
remain no significant differences between the matched set of treated and untreated districts. 
Using the results predicting treatment in the matching procedure to trim the sample based on 
the schools’ propensity scores – which provides a sample including districts receiving 
additional grants and comparable districts where no grants were awarded – leaves our results 
unaffected (see Table 5). 
___________________ 
Table 5 about here 
___________________ 
 
A final robustness check evaluates whether the results in Table 3 are really due to the 2007 
policy intervention by implementing a placebo estimation comparing the 2004-2005 period to 
the 2006-2007 period. A replication of the results of Table 3 during this exercise would 
indicate that the findings in Table 3 are not specific to the 2007 policy intervention, which 
would cast serious doubt on our interpretation that this intervention caused grade inflation. In 
other words, given that no intervention had yet taken place in the placebo sample, no 
significant effects should arise in this exercise. This is borne out by the three left-hand side 
columns of Table 6. Importantly, this result is not due to the reduction in sample size (to 635 
rather than 738 schools). In fact, running the original model (i.e., comparing the actual pre- 
and post-treatment periods) on this reduced sample produces significant effects very much in 
line with those reported in Table 3 (right-hand side columns of Table 6). 
 
___________________ 
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Table 6 about here 
___________________ 
 
6. Conclusion 
This paper examines, both theoretically and empirically, whether public expenditures induce 
improved educational attainment, grade inflation or both. By explicitly accounting for 
behavioral feedback effects in students’ and schools’ decisions following changes in the level 
of resources, our theoretical model shows that shifts in the grading structure chosen by schools 
are a real possibility when resources change. We test the model’s main implications exploiting 
a quasi-experimental setting in the Netherlands, where some disadvantaged neighborhoods 
received earmarked block grants and other similar districts did not. The Dutch education 
system thereby allowed us to distinguish the unbiased educational attainment of students 
(measured by standardized national exam scores) from the potentially inflated school-level 
exam grade (which is at the discretion of the school).  
 
Our results provide evidence for grade inflation following additional resource investments. 
More specifically, schools inflate their grades by failing to downgrade mean locally-assigned 
grades in spite of declining scores on national exams. Nevertheless, when the size of the 
additional resources is accounted for, the results are more nuanced: resources appear 
beneficial in terms of improving central exam results when the additional funds are 
sufficiently elevated, but induce grade inflation when the resources are limited. From a policy 
perspective, these results suggest that policy programs aimed at improving educational 
outcomes may easily ‘fail’ to reach pre-set targets when the apportioned resources are overly 
limited. True, rather than feigned, success requires sufficiently elevated additional funds. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics (N=738 schools) 
  ‘Untreated’ districts  ‘Treated’ districts 
 
Min Mean Max Min Mean Max 
Pre-intervention: 2004-06       
Central exam  4.553 6.423 8.914 4.520 6.225 7.443 
School exam 5.850 6.741 8.563 5.859 6.541 8.299 
Diff school & central exam -1.612 0.318 3.373 -0.857 0.316 2.843 
Total population 5.589 8.841 9.948 8.056 8.938 9.459 
Total number of students a 3.497 6.504 7.966 5.047 6.338 7.437 
Income (in 1000€) 9.150 13.698 25.600 9.300 11.376 14.650 
Share employed 39.000 69.268 85.000 48.333 57.734 70.000 
Share welfare recipients 6.000 15.804 42.400 17.000 25.117 33.750 
Urbaneness (5-point scale) 1 2.884 5 1 1.246 2.5 
Immigrant population 2.173 19.178 85.786 28.480 54.563 77.691 
Share younger than 25 11.852 23.028 40.771 21.850 26.163 35.484 
Share older than 65 1.775 17.408 57.896 6.977 13.304 21.826 
 Post-intervention: 2008-09       
Central exam  4.372 6.249 8.936 4.236 5.983 7.142 
School exam  5.919 6.736 8.700 5.824 6.560 8.258 
Diff school & central exam -1.337 0.488 3.539 -0.735 0.577 3.155 
Subsidy (1000€ per capita) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.339 1.420 3.962 
Total population 5.687 8.841 9.932 8.056 8.938 9.459 
Total number of students a 3.555 6.567 7.864 5.047 6.338 7.437 
Income (in 1000€) 9.150 13.698 25.600 9.300 11.376 14.650 
Share employed 39.000 69.268 85.000 48.333 57.734 70.000 
Share welfare recipients 6.000 15.804 42.400 17.000 25.117 33.750 
Urbaneness (5-point scale) 1 2.884 5 1 1.246 2.5 
Immigrant population 2.703 19.167 86.142 28.843 54.786 78.358 
Share younger than 25 12.108 23.072 41.272 21.505 26.282 34.518 
Share older than 65 1.501 17.396 48.837 6.113 13.164 22.025 
Note: a We only observe the total number of students for 523 schools. 
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Table 2: Pre-treatment (i.e., 2004-2007) trend in exam grades across subgroups 
 Central Exam Grade School Exam Grade 
Power district 
(yes = 1) 
-0.249 
(-1.51) 
-0.267 *** 
(-2.84) 
Period 2006-2007   
(yes = 1) 
-0.203 *** 
(-4.08) 
-0.054 * 
(-1.89) 
Power district *  
Period 2006-2007 
-0.009 
(-0.04) 
0.061 
(0.46) 
Number of schools included 636 636 
Note: Dependent variables are central (CEi,t) and school (SEi,t) exam grades, respectively. 
Entries are coefficient estimates from a random effects model comparing the 2004-
2005 period to the 2006-2007 period; ‘Power district’ is an indicator variable 
separating schools in treated from those in untreated districts; t-statistics in brackets; 
***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. Adding district population size, 
school’s student number and the share of immigrant, young and old residents as control 
variables leaves these findings unchanged. The same holds when estimation the model 
with fixed, rather than random, effects. 
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Table 3: Regression results using full sample (N=738 schools) 
 Results of equation (10) Results of equation (11) 
 (1) 
SE_CE 
(2) 
SE 
(3) 
CE 
(4) 
SE_CE 
(5) 
SE 
(6) 
CE 
Power district * 
Time (β2) 
0.133 
(1.59) 
0.042 
(0.90) 
-0.091 
(-1.15) 
0.469 *** 
(3.27) 
0.103 
(1.29) 
-0.366 *** 
(-2.68) 
Investment  
(1000€/cap; β3) 
- - - -0.222 *** 
(-2.87) 
-0.041 
(-0.94) 
0.181 ** 
(2.47) 
Period 2  
(yes = 1; β1) 
0.172 *** 
(9.15) 
-0.015 
(-1.47) 
-0.187 *** 
(-10.52) 
0.172 *** 
(9.123) 
-0.015 
(-1.47) 
-0.187 *** 
(-10.59) 
Population (log) 0.565 
(1.05) 
0.260 
(0.87) 
-0.305 
(-0.60) 
0.520 
(0.97) 
0.252 
(0.84) 
-0.267 
(-0.53) 
Students (log) 0.936 
(1.51) 
0.445 
(1.28) 
-0.491 
(-0.83) 
0.941 
(1.53) 
0.446 
(1.29) 
-0.496 
(-0.85) 
Students2 (log) -0.072 
(-1.46) 
-0.030 
(-1.10) 
0.042 
(0.89) 
-0.074 
(-1.51) 
-0.031 
(-1.11) 
0.043 
(0.93) 
Immigrants (%) 12.227 ** 
(2.44) 
4.531 
(1.62) 
-7.696 
(-1.62) 
11.353 ** 
(2.27) 
4.371 
(1.56) 
-6.982 
(-1.47) 
Immigrants2 (%) -13.909 * 
(-1.79) 
-5.989 
(-1.38) 
7.979 
(1.07) 
-12.199 
(-1.58) 
-5.675 
(-1.30) 
6.524 
(0.89) 
Young (%) -1.987 
(-0.56) 
-4.129 ** 
(-2.07) 
-2.141 
(-0.63) 
-1.689 
(-0.48) 
-4.074 ** 
(-2.04) 
-2.386 
(-0.71) 
Old (%) -0.260 
(-0.10) 
-1.061 
(-0.73) 
-0.801 
(-0.32) 
-0.062 
(-0.02) 
-1.024 
(-0.71) 
-0.962 
(-0.39) 
       
Fixed effects (γi) Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
 
F (joint sign) 
 
11.99 *** 
 
1.64 * 
 
14.54 *** 
 
11.77 *** 
 
1.56 
 
13.83 *** 
Note: Dependent variables are school (SEi,t) and central (CEi,t) exam grades as well as their difference (SEi,t–CEi,t). 
Entries are coefficient estimates from the fixed effects model given in equations (10) and (11) comparing the 
2004-2006 period to the 2008-2009 period; ‘Power district’ is an indicator variable separating schools in treated 
from those in untreated districts, while ‘investment’ refers to the annual additional public investment (in 1000€ 
per capita) from the policy program; t-statistics in brackets; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Regression results using restricted samples based on population characteristics 
 SE_CE SE CE SE_CE SE CE SE_CE SE CE SE_CE SE CE 
 Restricted migrant share Restricted population size Restricted young population Restricted elderly population 
Power district * 
Time (β2) 
0.319 * 
(1.96) 
0.110 
(1.18) 
-0.210 
(-1.55) 
0.347 ** 
(2.05) 
0.089 
(1.17) 
-0.258 * 
(-1.89) 
0.401 *** 
(2.65) 
0.123 * 
(1.68) 
-0.278 ** 
(-2.16) 
0.392 ** 
(2.41) 
0.108 
(1.43) 
-0.284 ** 
(-2.11) 
Investment  
(1000€/cap; β3) 
-0.186 ** 
(-2.09) 
-0.034 
(-0.68) 
0.151 ** 
(2.04) 
-0.186 * 
(-1.94) 
-0.046 
(-1.07) 
0.140 * 
(1.80) 
-0.206 ** 
(-2.40) 
-0.055 
(-1.32) 
0.151 ** 
(2.07) 
-0.205 ** 
(-2.22) 
-0.053 
(-1.24) 
0.152 ** 
(1.98) 
Period 2  
(yes = 1; β1) 
0.182 *** 
(3.82) 
-0.044 
(-1.62) 
-0.226 *** 
(-5.70) 
0.180 *** 
(7.90) 
-0.003 
(-0.33) 
-0.183 *** 
(-9.97) 
0.163 *** 
(6.95) 
-0.019 * 
(-1.68) 
-0.182 *** 
(-9.11) 
0.164 *** 
(7.03) 
-0.009 
(-0.80) 
-0.172 *** 
(-8.94) 
 
N 
F (joint sign) 
 
163 
4.75 *** 
 
163 
1.86 * 
 
163 
7.09 *** 
 
674 
9.47 *** 
 
674 
1.05 
 
674 
14.30 *** 
 
539 
8.30 *** 
 
539 
1.26 
 
539 
12.87 *** 
 
612 
8.15 *** 
 
612 
0.63 
 
612 
12.54 *** 
Note: Dependent variables are school (SEi,t) and central (CEi,t) exam grades as well as their difference (SEi,t–CEi,t). Entries are coefficient estimates from the fixed effects model given in equation 
(11) comparing the 2004-2006 period to the 2008-2009 period; ‘Power district’ is an indicator variable separating schools in treated from those in untreated districts, while ‘investment’ refers to 
the annual additional public investment (in 1000€ per capita) from the policy program; Controls included as in table 3. t-statistics in brackets; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Regression results using restricted samples based on propensity scores 
 SE_CE SE CE SE_CE SE CE SE_CE SE CE 
 Excluding propensity scores  
<1% and >99% 
Excluding propensity scores  
<5% and >95% 
Excluding propensity scores  
<10% and >90% 
Power district * 
Time (β2) 
0.373 ** 
(2.27) 
0.113 
(1.39) 
-0.259 * 
(-1.97) 
0.433 ** 
(2.29) 
0.094 
(0.99) 
-0.339 ** 
(-2.39) 
0.467 * 
(2.01) 
0.158 
(1.38) 
-0.309 * 
(-1.78) 
Investment  
(1000€/cap; β3) 
-0.199 ** 
(-2.27) 
-0.037 
(-0.86) 
0.162 ** 
(2.29) 
-0.218 ** 
(-2.27) 
-0.026 
(-0.54) 
0.192 ** 
(2.62) 
-0.214 * 
(-1.89) 
-0.017 
(-0.30) 
0.198 ** 
(2.34) 
Period 2  
(yes = 1; β1) 
0.164 *** 
(2.67) 
-0.039 
(-1.29) 
-0.203 *** 
(-4.11) 
0.150 * 
(1.79) 
-0.031 
(-0.72) 
-0.181 *** 
(-2.82) 
0.074 
(0.69) 
-0.070 
(-1.34) 
-0.144 * 
(-1.80) 
 
N 
F (joint sign) 
 
200 
3.33 *** 
 
200 
0.85 
 
200 
5.07 *** 
 
138 
2.65 *** 
 
138 
0.53 
 
138 
4.23 *** 
 
104 
1.53 
 
104 
0.76 
 
104 
2.25 ** 
Note: Dependent variables are school (SEi,t) and central (CEi,t) exam grades as well as their difference (SEi,t–CEi,t). Entries are coefficient estimates from the 
fixed effects model given in equation (11) comparing the 2004-2006 period to the 2008-2009 period; ‘Power district’ is an indicator variable separating 
schools in treated from those in untreated districts, while ‘investment’ refers to the annual additional public investment (in 1000€ per capita) from the 
policy program. Propensity scores obtained from a probit regression using population size and percentage immigrants (and its squared value) as well as 
the level of urbanization, the percentage of employed residents and welfare recipients (both as share of working-age population) and average income in 
the district (measured as after-tax income in 1000€; and its squared value) as explanatory variables. Controls included as in table 3 (except for Students, 
which is excluded here to maintain sufficient sample sizes). t-statistics in brackets; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively.  
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Table 6: Regression results of placebo estimation (2004-05, 2006-07) 
 SE_CE SE CE SE_CE SE CE 
 Comparing 2004-05 to 2006-07  
(placebo) 
Comparing 2004-06 to 2008-09  
(treatment) 
Power district * 
Time (β2) 
0.193 
(1.35) 
0.158 
(1.16) 
-0.035 
(-0.17) 
0.478 *** 
(3.09) 
0.114 
(1.31) 
-0.364 ** 
(-2.46) 
Investment  
(1000€/cap; β3) 
-0.106 
(-1.41) 
-0.068 
(-0.95) 
0.038 
(0.36) 
-0.211 ** 
(-2.45) 
-0.048 
(-1.00) 
0.162 ** 
(1.97) 
Period 2  
(yes = 1; β1) 
0.178 *** 
(10.15) 
-0.063 *** 
(-3.76) 
-0.241 *** 
(-9.85) 
0.173 *** 
(8.74) 
-0.017 
(-1.50) 
-0.190 *** 
(-10.03) 
 
N 
F (joint sign) 
 
635 
12.26 *** 
 
635 
3.75 *** 
 
635 
11.99 *** 
 
636 
10.95 *** 
 
636 
1.67 * 
 
636 
12.65 *** 
Note: Dependent Variables are school (SEi,t) and central (CEi,t) exam grades as well as their difference (SEi,t–CEi,t). Entries are 
coefficient estimates from the fixed effects model given in equation (11); ‘Power district’ is an indicator variable separating 
schools in treated from those in untreated districts, while ‘investment’ refers to the annual additional public investment (in 1000€ 
per capita) from the policy program; Controls included as in table 3. t-statistics in brackets; ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5% and 
10%, respectively. 
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Appendix A: Alternative specification of the exam result function 
Apart from the setting presented in the main text, we consider a second possibility to model the 
functional form of the function describing the overall exam results: 
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= + +
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  (12) 
Again, both the central and the school exam results can be influenced by the students’ effort 
choice. Different from before is that students now receive 1
n
 points on the school exam that 
may result from knowing the kind of questions the teacher might ask. Alternatively, it can be 
interpreted as reflecting the lower average difficulty of school exams (compared to central 
exams). The students’ maximization problem in equation (2) then gives the following results: 
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The main difference in results from those presented in the main text is that a change in 
education expenditures now has a positive effect on student effort. Apart from that, the effects 
in the first-order condition are qualitatively similar as above. 
 
The school’s first-order condition for the optimal grading standard and the cross-derivative 
with respect to x now become: 
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*
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and 
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It is easy to see that the effects in equations (13) and (14) are qualitatively similar to the ones in 
equations (5) and (8) presented in the main text. An increase of n leads to better results in the 
central exam but lowers students’ grades in the school exam. The difference between the 
results decreases in the grading standard (if n<1 is assumed, which is equivalent to the 
assumption of nc > ns in the main text). Higher educational spending strengthens the negative 
effect tougher grading has on school exam results, but also leads to a larger decrease in the 
results’ difference. Again, the overall effect is dependent on the relative strength of both 
effects, but, as before, grade inflation following increased public education expenditures 
remains a theoretical possibility. 
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Appendix B: Students with differing abilities 
 
In section 3, we abstracted from heterogeneity in student ability.  We can, however, extend the 
model by assuming that students are equipped with different learning abilities aj – taken from a 
distribution function F(a) with associated density function f(a). These abilities, which cannot 
be altered by education, positively influence the productivity of effort and thereby the overall 
exam result: 
 
0 01 1 .c sj c j s jc sy p n xea p n xean n
= − + + − +
  
(15) 
As before, students choose their learning effort given the grading standards on both exams 
according to equation (3), which results in: 
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Equation (16) shows that effort decreases in abilities aj 0j
j
e
a
 ∂
<  ∂ 
, which reflects the idea that 
students can obtain the same grade by investing less time in learning and thus opt for an 
increase in leisure. In contrast, tougher grading on either the school or the central exam 
increases effort independent of aj, in line with the basic model.
  
 
 
As exam results now depend on individuals’ abilities, the different abilities and exams results 
are weighted with their density and thus enter the school’s objective function. As a result, the 
school’s maximization problem becomes:
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where the integrals stand for the average results on the overall, central and school exams, 
respectively.22 The first-order condition for the optimal grading standard reads: 
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Again, an increase of the school’s grading standard decreases the average exam result y , as 
shown by the first integral of equation (17). The second term is positive, which implies a 
decline of the difference between average results on the central and school exams across all 
abilities. Assuming 0c s− <  holds, the two opposing effects provide an inner solution and 
determine the grading standard ns.  
 
To investigate the existence of grade inflation, the implicit function theorem (equation (7)) is 
employed again. Whether an increase in education expenditures induces deteriorating grading 
standards depends on the sign of the cross-derivative 
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(18) 
22 The number of households is normalized to unity. 
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Similar to the basic model, equation (18) shows that an increase in expenditures on the one 
hand raises the school’s incentive for grade inflation because the positive effects of a lower 
grading standard on y get stronger in x. On the other hand, the decrease of the difference (c-s)2 
is amplified in x as well, thereby strengthening the incentive to increase ns. Thus, extending the 
model by considering students of differing abilities does not alter the model’s results 
qualitatively. Still, grade inflation following an expenditure increase remains a possible 
outcome. 
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